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Competition, Competition Policy, Competitiveness, Globalisation and 
Development2 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper explores the connections between globalization, competition, 
competition policy and competitiveness.  These concepts and the 
relationships between them have emerged as important issues in the 
current development debate at both national and international levels.  The 
significance at the national level arises from the privatization and 
liberalization policies which have been adopted by many developing 
countries in recent decades.  The international significance is directly 
related to globalization and the continuing deep integration of the world 
economy through multinational companies and fast growth of global trade.  
 
The external dimension is at present particularly important because of the 
worldwide economic downturn.  In these circumstances multinational 
companies and governments try to evade their international commitments 
by relaxing free competition in relation to particular coveted industries  
and products. The return of protection in advanced industrial countries is 
increasingly well documented, (see e.g. Evernett 2011). However it is not 
yet a major fault for the international competition system. In spite of the 
many difficulties of enforcing fairly rules of WTO,  most advanced and 
emerging countries by and large work within the system and, so far, there 
are relatively few infringements of the rules.  
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Another reason for the importance of the global dimension is the failure of 
the Doha Round of trade negotiations which has made it more difficult for 
the relevant international institutions, such as the World Trade 
Organisation, to further their agenda for free trade in the international 
marketplace as well as provide enough space for development for emerging 
countries.  Appropriate and duly agreed and enforced competition policies 
comprise one way for the international organisations to achieve these 
objectives.  However for such policies to work they have to overcome not 
only economic but also political issues which are complex and differ 
between countries. 
 
Turning briefly to the concept of competition itself, it is central to neo-
classical analysis and the theory of growth which follows from such a 
perspective.  At the simplest level, competition theory asserts that those 
countries which have the highest rate of technical progress will also have 
the highest rate of growth.  Further, the greater or more intense the 
competition, the greater the rate of technical progress.  On the basis of 
these two relationships, the World Bank in its landmark 1991 World 
Development Report asserted3: “Competitive markets are the best way yet 
found for efficiently organising the production and distribution of goods 
and services. Domestic and external competition provides the incentives 
that unleash entrepreneurship and technological progress.”  
 
This view is not universally accepted and will be challenged in this paper.  
Similarly, competitiveness is a somewhat different concept than 
competition per se.  In some polemical writings in the 1990s Paul Krugman 
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(1994-1996) made the notion of competitiveness famous by declaring it to 
be a dangerous obsession and termed it as ‘pop internationalism’.  Howes 
and Singh (1990) noted: ‘with pop internationalism, he associates the idea 
that the recent ills of the US economy – eroding real wages, stagnating 
living standards, rising inequality and unemployment – are the 
consequences of a major erosion of the industrial base due to international 
competition’. Krugman went on to claim that the notion of competitiveness 
might be useful when applied to a corporation but was utterly meaningless 
when applied to a nation.  Krugman’s analysis will be challenged in this 
essay and will be shown why, contrary to him, competitiveness is a useful 
concept and is important for economic policy. 
 
So far we have introduced the two of the five concepts in the title of the 
paper.  The third concept is that of competition policy.  This consists of 
policies to change corporate conduct, structure and behaviour so as to 
maintain competition, national and international.  Fourthly we introduce 
the question of globalisation.  This has many different meanings for 
different people but in order to keep the discussion unambiguous this 
paper regards globalisation as consisting of free trade, free capital flows 
but not free labour markets4.  The latter however are assumed to be flexible 
at the national level.  We have adopted this procedure, not because it is 
correct in economic theory, but it is simply to make our analyses 
comparable with that of the World Bank and those of other orthodox 
economists. From an economic perspective, the more attractive 
methodology would assume free labour markets analogous with free 
capital markets.  
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The main purpose of the paper is to explore the relationship between these 
four concepts and economic development. The latter for reasons of space 
and not to lose the focus of this discussion, is taken to be simply economic 
growth.  Agencies like the World Bank regard competition policy as 
essential for economic development.  Implicit in the orthodox analysis is 
also the notion that the more competition the better.  Or in other words, the 
optimal competition is the maximum competition.  Both of these 
propositions are subject to challenge.  
  
This paper contributes by its conceptualisation of the main issues which 
arise in the modern discussion of competition and competition policies in 
economic development.  It also contributes by its extensive treatment of 
the international dimensions of the subject.  Most importantly, it is among 
the few papers which put economic development at the centre stage for 
competition and related policies. It also contributes by its proposal for 
establishment of a development-oriented international competition 
authority. 
 
As there are a number of concepts being used in this essay, from a 
pedagogical point of view, it may be useful at this stage to provide a 
summary of the main conclusions: 
 
 Even if they did not do so in the past, developing countries need a 
competition policy today, because of two main reasons. 
 One, the advanced capitalist economies are subject periodically to 
gigantic international cross border as well as huge domestic merger 
movements.  To cope with such mergers and protect themselves from 
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involuntary and harmful takeovers of domestic firms, developing 
countries need a competition policy.   
 Two, there are significant structural changes within developing 
countries themselves arising from privatisation and deregulation which 
many of these countries had accepted during the Washington consensus 
period.   
 Unless regulatory changes are made, with privatisation there is a danger 
of replacing public monopolies with private monopolies.  It is worth 
noting in this context that public monopolies are in general to be 
preferred to private monopolies for the simple reason that public 
monopolies often carry a legal injunction to advance the welfare of 
citizens.  By contrast, the main objective of the private firm is to 
maximise shareholder value. 
 In the first and only comprehensive study of the intensity of competition 
in emerging markets, Glen, Lee and Singh (2003) had reported the 
astonishing results that as conventionally measured, the intensity of 
competition is lower in the developed countries than in developing 
countries. Despite all the new methodology which has been introduced 
in recent years in the persistence of profitability studies, Glen, Lee and 
Singh (2003) results still stand for emerging markets.5 
 The above is not just a statistical result but it has a solid economic 
foundation which is explained in the paper. 
 Analysis and evidence indicates that maximum competition is not 
necessarily optimal, in terms of dynamic efficiency. 
 There is little evidence that the international cross border merger waves 
of the period before the global crisis of 2008 to 2012 enhanced global 
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economic efficiency any more than did the largely domestic merger 
waves before then. See Singh (2007), Tichy (2010) and  Scherer (1994)6. 
 The current competition policies in the UK and the EU are unsuitable for 
developing countries – countries at different levels of development and 
governance capacities require different types of competition policies. 
Nevertheless, developing countries have much to learn from the 
experience of Japan and Korea in blending competition policies with 
industrial policies.  
 It is argued here that the present competition policy discourse, in which 
WTO plays a major role, is unfair to developing countries. The very 
concepts used in the WTO discussions in the international fora are 
prejudicial to the interests of developing countries. To make these 
concepts development friendly, a new language is required to replace 
the WTO concepts of most-favoured nation treatment, national 
treatment and market access. 
 The paper presents a proposal for a development-oriented international 
competition authority to control anti-competitive conduct and growth 
by mergers of large multinational companies.  
 
II.  Competition Policy in Emerging Countries 
 
We start our substantive discussion of emerging markets with the 
important question of how competitive are these markets.  Do they need a 
new competition policy to encourage competition and to foster economic 
development.  The record indicates until recently very few developing 
countries had introduced competition policy.  UNCTAD (2000) suggests 
                                                          
6
 It has been suggested that mergers may decrease competition rather than increase it. In theory and in 
practice either outcome is possible depending on the circumstances. Mergers between oligopolistic firms may 
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that until 1990 only sixteen developing countries had a formal competition 
policy.  With encouragement and technical assistance from international 
financial institutions and from the WTO, fifty countries completed 
legislation for competition laws in the 1990s.  This may seem like good 
progress but as Scherer (1994) pointed out that it takes about ten years for 
countries to acquire the necessary expertise and experience to implement 
such laws effectively after the primary legislation has been approved by the 
legislature. Scherer was being over-optimistic. Mendoza, Barcenas and 
Mahurkar (2012) conclude from their recent review of the empirical 
literature and the experience of South Korea, China, India and Indonesia 
with respect to competition policies that what emerges is a picture of a 
‘delicate, balancing act’ between policies to attain the advantages of 
industrial concentration and those that foster market competition in 
different countries economic development trajectories. The imposition of 
competition laws is quite chaotic and their success depends on the 
coherence with the country’s overall development strategy. The three 
authors suggest that interest groups that benefit from initial industrial 
support policies will typically resist the introduction of competition laws 
and policies.  
 
Table 1 provides a brief account of the competition laws in practice that 
have so far been enacted in the above countries, except India. The Indian 
situation is even more complicated as Bhattacharya (2013) in his excellent 
article on the new Indian legislation on competition policy suggests. In the 
last 10 years, while the competition legislation was being revised the old 
competition act called the “Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
(MRTP)” was still in operation. Bhattacharya’s research shows that there 
were very few cases which were tried and which pertained to anti-trust. 
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Most cases, under MRTP, were concerned with consumer welfare issues, 
including many concerning the clarifications of the law. It remains to be 
seen how the competition law will work in a developing country with its 
own strong legal traditions. It may take another 10 years before it could be 
said that the country has a coherent competition policy. 
 
Nevertheless the main reason why developing countries did not have 
competition policies in the past would appear to be that these were not 
much needed.  This was in part due to considerable state control over 
economic activity and if the government thought there was anti-
competitive behaviour by some corporations or industries it intervened 
directly and fixed prices such as for medicine and other essential products.  
In addition state owned industries were not allowed to charge monopoly 
prices.   
 
III.  The State of Competition in Developing Countries 
 
How much competition exists in developing countries? The popular 
impression is that developing country markets do not display much 
competition or rivalrous behaviour.  There are numerous government 
created barriers to entry and exit, from an industry.  Besides, there is 
underdeveloped infrastructure which makes the markets inefficient.  
Fortunately there is some hard new empirical evidence which sheds some 
light on this issue.  These relatively new studies use the persistence of 
profitability approach to measure the degree of competition in a market or 
in an economy as a whole.  The basic methodology used in these studies is 
outlined below. 
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How should the intensity of competition in a jurisdiction be measured?  
The current widely accepted approach to such measurement is to introduce 
the concept of persistence of profitability. The intuition behind this 
procedure is that if there were competition in the market, firms with high 
profitability in one period would not have high profitability in a subsequent 
period. If the competition was intense, there will be no, or very little, serial 
correlation between profits in one period, and profits in subsequent 
periods. There is now a standard methodology for implementing 
systematically this intuition. The methodology may be stated as follows: 
 
PP studies, it will be recalled, are based on the following autoregressive 
equation applied to the time series of profitability of individual firms. 
  
π
i,t
 = α
i
 + λ
i
π
i, t-1
 + μ
i,t  
         (1) 
  
π
i,t  
is the profitability of firm i at time t, i = 1,….,m, t = 1,…..,T.  μ
i,t
 is the usual 
error term and α
i
 and λ
i
 are the model parameters.  λ
i
 indicates the speed of 
adjustment; if λ
i 
< 1, the long-run (permanent) profitability level of firm i is 
given by: 
  
π
i,p
 = α
i
 / 1-λ
i
               (2) 
 
As is usual in PP studies, to control for business cycles and other 
macroeconomic shocks, the regression analysis is conducted in terms of the 
variable Yi,t = πi,t - πt , where πt is the average of the πi,t across firms.  The 
measure Yit represents the deviation of firm i's profitability at time t from the 
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profitability of all other firms in the country at that time.  The analysis is 
based on models of the form:  
Yit = i + 1i Yi(t-1) + 2i Yi(t-2) + it        (3) 
where i, 1i and 2i are coefficients and the it are random errors. The 
empirical analysis shows that this AR2 model is sufficient to capture the 
dynamics in all cases in the seven emerging countries examined in this study.  
From (3), the statistic YiLR = αi / (1-λ1i - λ2i) can be derived to indicate firm i's 
long-term profitability relative to the country average.  If 2i=0, then the 
estimate of 1i provides a direct measure of the speed of adjustment of 
profitability following a shock. Assuming λ1i(0,1), adjustment to 
equilibrium is monotonic.  Where 2i is not zero or λ1i (-1, 0), adjustment is 
non-monotonic and there is no unique way of characterising its speed based 
on the estimated parameters. [See further Goddard and Wilson (1999)]. 
Most of the work on the application of the above model has been done on 
developed countries. Glen, Lee and Singh (2003) is the only comprehensive 
study of competition intensity in developing countries. The three authors 
provide empirical results on the state of competition in seven major 
markets – Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Korea, Jordan and Zimbabwe. 
There are two other papers which also consider developing countries, one 
is by Kambhampati (1995) with respect to India and the other is by 
Yurtöglu (2004) with respect to Turkey.  The findings of Kambhampati’s 
paper are open to some debate as these are based on data that cannot 
reject the unit root hypothesis in the vast majority of cases using standard 
methods. This creates difficulties for the statistical and economic 
interpretation of empirical results in PP studies. Glen et al (op cit) 
overcome these problems by using the more powerful Im-Pesaran test, that 
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by exploiting the panel structure of the data allows us to reject non-
stationarity of profitability. The astonishing substantive result from these 
studies is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the intensity of 
competition in leading emerging markets is certainly no less than that 
observed in advanced countries. 
 
This model is applied by Glen, Lee and Singh (2003) to data from seven 
emerging countries – Brazil India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico and 
Zimbabwe, and the results are reported in Table 2. Profitability is measured 
by the return on net assets of the firm. The sample frame is the hundred 
largest firms quoted on the stock market in each country.  
The estimated values of λi and the proportion of firms for which YiLR are 
either significantly positive or significantly negative at the 5% level for 
emerging markets are reported in Table 2.  The exactly corresponding 
values of these variables for advanced countries, estimated by other 
researchers, are reported in Tables 3 and 4.     
The results indicate that the λ for developing countries is considerably 
smaller than that for advanced countries. It lies in the region of 0.013 and 
0.421. The corresponding results for the value of λ of advanced countries 
indicate that the values of this parameter lies in the region of 0.50. This 
suggests, in the normal discourse of the persistence of profitability studies 
that there is greater competition in developing countries than in advanced 
countries. This empirical conclusion is contrary to most economists’ 
expectations. There are similarly many barriers to entry into these 
markets, however Singh (2003 and 2007) points out that there are a 
number of structural factors in developing countries which are also pro -
competition. These include the low quality and simplicity of products 
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demanded, contest-based competition whereby subsidies are given only in 
exchange for the firms meeting performance standards.   
There have been some recent advances in the methodology applied to 
persistency of profitability studies and there are new results.  Adelina 
Gschwandtner (2012) has analysed and compared persistence of profits in 
three periods for the US economy – 1950-66, 1967-83 and 1984-90.  One 
notable feature of this study is that, whereas the previous scholars have only 
considered the set of surviving firms, Gschwandtner considers both 
surviving and non-surviving firms.  Her results are totally plausible.  She 
finds that the intensity of competition in the US economy increased 
systematically over time during the half century she examined.  She found 
the main determinants of profit persistence to be the firms and industry 
size, industry growth, risk and advertising. 
 
IV. Economic Theory and Competition Policy in Emerging Countries 
Recent advances in economic theory, particularly agency theory, 
transaction cost theory, and information theory, have greatly enriched our 
understanding of how competition and competition policy may work in 
various spheres of an economy and in different economies.  Thus, a leading 
authority on the theory of industrial organization has recently observed: 
"Competition is an unambiguously good thing in the first-best world of 
economists.  That world assumes large numbers of participants in all 
markets, no public goods, no externalities, no information asymmetries, no 
natural monopolies, complete markets, fully rational economic agents, a 
benevolent court system to enforce contracts, and a benevolent 
government providing lump sum transfers to achieve any desirable 
redistribution.  Because developing countries are so far from this ideal world, 
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it is not always the case that competition should be encouraged in these 
countries" (italics added) (Laffont, 1998, p.237). 
This author provides a number of examples to support his contention.  All 
of these involve what economists call the theory of the "second best."  The 
latter asserts that, if any one of the assumptions required for the validity of 
the fundamental theorems of welfare economics cannot be met, restricted 
rather than unrestricted competition may be a superior strategy.  Laffont 
draws particular attention to the "demonization" by many economists 
(including those at the World Bank) of cross subsidization of different 
groups by large public utilities.  However, he points out that in developing 
countries, where, in practice, taxes cannot be collected from the wealthy for 
re-distribution, it may be a good strategy for the government to require 
public utilities in these countries to subsidize poor consumers in the 
countryside at the expense of richer residents in the city. It may be useful to 
note here that cross-subsidisation is widely used in advanced countries as 
well. 
Laffont suggests that even if competition policy of the kind followed by 
advanced countries such as the US or the UK were appropriate for poor 
African countries, they are a long way from having the institutional 
capacity to implement such policies.  The implementation of a 
comprehensive competition policy requires a strong state which many 
developing countries at low levels of industrialization do not have.  
Therefore, at the very least, for such countries there will need to be far 
fewer and simpler competition rules which are capable of being enforced.  
Clearly it would be unfair, if not absurd, to subject a Sierra Leone to the 
same competition policy disciplines as the US.  
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We now turn to the consideration of the case of the semi-industrial 
countries, many of which are now fairly advanced in industrial 
development, e.g. Korea, India, Brazil, Mexico.  These countries have 
reasonably strong states with competent government machinery. However, 
economic theory suggests that, even for these economies, the US and UK 
types of competition policies may be inappropriate.  A very important 
reason for this conclusion is that the essential focus of competition policy in 
advanced countries such as the US is the promotion of allocative efficiency 
and reduced prices for consumers (WTO 1997).  However, from the 
standpoint of economic development, this perspective is too narrow and 
static. In order to raise their people's standard of living, a central objective 
of developing countries must necessarily be the promotion of long term 
growth of productivity. The pursuit of this objective of dynamic rather than 
static efficiency requires, among other things, high rates of investment.  In a 
private enterprise economy, this necessitates encouragement of 
entrepreneurs' propensity to invest.  However, the private sector's animal 
spirits are likely to be dampened if, as a result of competition, profits 
became too low, even if only temporarily.  
This suggests that unfettered competition may not be appropriate for a 
developing economy.  Economic theory as well as experience indicate that, 
in the real world of incomplete and missing markets, unfettered 
competition may lead to price wars and ruinous rivalry and therefore may 
be inimical to future investment: from this perspective, too much 
competition can be as harmful as too little.  What is required by developing 
economies is an optimal degree of competition which would entail 
sufficient rivalry to reduce inefficiency in the corporate use of resources at 
the microeconomic level, but not so much competition that it would deter 
the propensity to invest.  This central analytical point is altogether ignored 
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in competition policy discourse in countries such as the US where the 
concept of optimal degree of competition is simply assumed to be 
maximum competition, that is, the more competition the better.7 
V.  Competition Policy in Japan and Korea 
It is useful in this context to reflect on the operation of competition policy 
in Japan in the period 1950-1973.  The Japanese economy achieved 
historically unprecedented growth during this time span: its manufacturing 
production rose at a phenomenal rate of about 13 per cent a year, GDP at 
10 per cent a year, and its share in world exports of manufacture rose by a 
huge 10 percentage points (Singh, 1998).  A central role in this spectacular 
economic advance was played by the very high rates of savings and 
investment in the Japanese economy.  As noted earlier, the competition 
policy was subordinated to industrial policy, an essential concern of which 
was to maintain the private sector's high propensity to invest.  For this 
purpose, the Japanese government's Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) frequently imposed restrictions on product market 
competition. Amsden and Singh (1994) note: "It (MITI) encouraged a 
variety of cartel arrangements in a wide range of industries -- export and 
import cartels, cartels to combat depression or excessive competition, 
rationalization cartels, etc. Similarly, believing that large scale enterprises 
were required for promotion of technical change and for Japanese firms to 
compete effectively with their western counterparts, MITI encouraged 
mergers between leading firms in key industries" (Amsden and Singh, 
1994, p. 944). This policy was  not always arguably correct. 
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 See earlier discussion of philosophy of US competition policy which finds virtue in competition itself rather 
than to examine its effects. 
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The Korean government broadly followed the Japanese strategy of 
economic development. It also had a strong industrial policy which, as in 
the case of Japan, dominated competition policy.  The government helped 
create the mammoth corporations, the chaebol, which went on to capture 
world markets. Korea was unequivocally an industrially backward country 
in the 1950s.  Its per capita manufacturing output in 1955 was US$ 8 
compared to US$ 7 in India and US$ 56 in Mexico.  To put it another way, 
South Korea’s per capita income in the mid 1960s was less than $300. 
However the economy’s future prospects were regarded as dismal. The US 
congress passed a resolution to say that South Korea should not be given 
developmental aid but only humanitarian aid. Yet over the last four 
decades, Korea has transformed itself into an industrial and technologically 
sophisticated economy with a per capita income of US $20,0008.  
As a result of lax enforcement of competition policy, Korea has one of the 
highest levels of industrial concentration in the world.  However, the giant 
conglomerates compete with each other fiercely.  A significant part of the 
competition has been of the non-market variety in which the chaebol have 
competed for government support.  The latter has been given in return for 
meeting specified performance targets for exports, new product 
development, and technological change.  In the market place, the chaebol 
competed for market share, as that determined their subsequent 
investment allocations in a particular industry9.  As in Japan between 1950-
1973, the Korean government until recently has purposefully co-ordinated 
industrial investments by competing chaebol, so as to prevent overcapacity 
and too much competition (Chang, 1994). 
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 Source of these statistics, see among others Singh (2012). 
9
 There was heavy emphasis in the Korean industrialisation programme on import controls which many South 
Korean companies practiced. Without such protection the particular path of industrialisation chosen by South 
Korea may not have worked.  
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VI. New Developments in the Theory of Industrial Organization 
The policies adopted by these East Asian countries find endorsement in the 
new developments in economic theory. Essentially, modern economic 
theory suggests that dynamic efficiency is best promoted by a combination 
of co-operation and competition between firms rather than by maximum or 
unfettered competition (Graham and Richardson, 1997). 
It has been suggested by some scholars and high US government officials 
that the 1997-2000 financial crisis in Asia demonstrates the failure of state-
directed capitalism of the Asian countries.  However, a careful analysis of 
these issues indicates that the crisis was caused not by too much state 
direction but rather by too little. Overinvestment by the chaebol in Korea or 
the property bubble in Thailand were caused essentially by the fact that 
these countries were pursuing capital account liberalization in the period 
immediately before the crisis. Korea had become a member of the OECD in 
the early 1990s and in fact had abolished its planning agency.  Neither 
industrial overinvestment by the chaebol nor excessive investment in the 
property sector in Thailand would have occurred had the governments co-
ordinated investment activity as before.10 
In addition to the discussion of the above issues in relation to Laffont and 
economic theory, another major analysis of this paper is that competition 
policy that is appropriate for developing countries and takes into account 
the “development dimension” cannot and should not be the same as the 
                                                          
10 For various interpretations of the Asian financial crisis see Singh (1998b, 1999a); Singh and Weisse (1999); 
Radelet and Sachs (1998); US Council of Economic Advisors (1999); IMF (1998); World Bank (1999).  
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policy that is implemented in advanced countries such as the US and the 
European Union economies11. 
 
It is also strongly argued here that the kind of competition policy needed in 
developing countries is not only different from that for advanced countries 
but to do justice to the particularities of the development process, a 
different language is needed.  The conduct of the normal current discourse 
in international fora in terms of the language and the framework of the 
WTO – market access, national treatment, reciprocity and the most 
favoured nation clause – does not do justice to the economic conditions 
prevailing in developing countries; indeed, such concepts are arguably 
prejudicial to developmental needs in this specific context.  
 
It is also suggested here that the new concepts which should be introduced 
into the discourse for addressing the developmental dimension are 
thoroughly grounded in modern economic theory and there is considerable 
national and international empirical evidence to support them.  However, it 
must be added, that these elements are new only in relation to the current 
international discourse on the subject.  These are widely used in the theory 
and practice of industrial organization.  Indeed some of these are implicit in 
the WTO agreements themselves – see for example the discussion of the 
agreement on intellectual property rights. 
 
VII. Competitiveness and Economic Development 
We next take up the question of competitiveness which was introduced in 
the Introduction with negative comments from Paul Krugman. The concept 
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 Or indeed was implemented in the same countries in their period of industrialisation! 
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of competitiveness which Krugman dismissed as entirely erroneous when 
applied to the case of a country, has some analytical virtues which cannot 
simply be ignored. Krugman is of course right in asserting that neither 
trade surplus of a country nor its deficit are indicators of economic 
efficiency or inefficiency without further information. He also suggests that 
competitiveness in this sense is of limited relevance to the US economy 
because international trade was a very small part of it. At the time he was 
writing it was no more than 2 per cent of GDP. The present figure is about 
15 per cent.  Krugman is basically using a neoclassical economic model in 
which there is complete wage price flexibility and changes in the terms of 
trade help to equilibriate the system. In contrast to Krugman, other leading 
US economists have shown much more sympathy for the competitiveness 
approach.  
Laura Tyson, a former Chairman of the US Committee of Economic 
Advisors, offered the following definition of competitiveness: she defined it 
as the “ability to produce goods and services that meet the test of 
international competition, while our citizens enjoy a standard of living that 
is both rising and sustainable.” This is a more robust definition of 
international competitiveness to which Krugman’s strictures scarcely 
apply, if at all. He admits that if trade is a large part of GNP, any currency 
devaluation to maintain trade barriers would in principle have a depressive 
effect on the rate of growth of real incomes. However, the essential point 
here is that Krugman is arguing that the standard of living of a country is 
almost entirely dependent on the rate of growth of domestic productivity 
and not productivity growth relative to competitors.  
The UK, provides for an advanced economy, an apt illustration of its lack of 
competitiveness in the mid 1970s. Following the first oil price shock of 
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1973-74, the UK economy which was then not a major producer and 
exporter of oil, suffered an adverse movement in its terms of trade. Howes 
and Singh (2000) estimate that the size of the shock was about 4 per cent of 
GDP. They observed, “Instead of a smooth adjustment of the economy 
through movements in the exchange rates, there was a protracted process 
that involved redistributive struggles between various social groups over 
the diminished national pie. The net result was a doubling of    the rate of 
unemployment, a quadrupling of the rate of inflation, a full-blown financial 
crisis, and ultimately, the humiliation for an advanced industrial country of 
being forced to accept an IMF rescue package, before internal and external 
equilibria could be restored.” Howes and Singh go on to suggest, “Thus a 
relatively small terms-of-trade shock can have serious repercussions for 
even an advanced economy. The validity of Krugman’s analysis of national 
competitiveness requires an abstraction from such labor market 
dynamics.” There are other similar considerations which suggest that 
Krugman has been following basically the wrong track.  
Empirical evidence from industrial countries suggest that countries like 
Japan and Germany, whose share of the world markets increased between 
1963-75, despite the fact that their prices and costs relative to other 
countries, were rising. This paradox was first examined by the Late 
Professor Kaldor and subsequently confirmed over an extended period by 
Faberberg (1996, Table 1.) The paradox is best explained by the fact that a 
great deal of international competition takes place in non-price terms 
rather than in terms of prices.  The reason for the positive association 
between productivity growth and market share is that countries with high 
rates of productivity growth also have high rates of investment and output 
growth. Howes and Singh note that such countries thereby achieve faster 
technical progress, greater learning-by-doing and quicker development of 
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new products. If one considers the history of the last ten to twelve years, 
there cannot be much doubt of the competitive deficit of the US economy.  
The US has been running current account deficit which have been of the 
order of 5 per cent of GDP at the full employment level of income.  These, in 
turn have led to global imbalances which certainly increased financial 
fragility in the world economy, even though these may not have been the 
main causal factor. Both competition policy and industrial policy have a 
role to play in this re-balancing of the US economy.  
 
VIII. Competition and competition policy in the economic history of 
East Asia 
Until relatively recently there were serious issues in relation to 
competition policy and economic history. These controversies arose in 
their most acute form in relation to the economic history of East Asian 
countries. The historic assessment of the role of competition and 
competition policies in these countries as well as their implications for the 
other countries are critical issues in these debates. 
For a long time neoclassical economists (eg. Béla Balassa as late as 1990s)  
were claiming that governments have little involvement in the economy in 
East Asia. Thus Béla Balassa (1988) best summed up the analysis of the 
neoclassical school as well as that of the Bretton Woods institutions who 
were a major contributor to the debate, in the following terms. “The above 
remarks are not meant to deny the role of government in the economic life 
of East Asia. But, apart from the promotion of shipbuilding and steel in 
Korea and a few strategic industries in Taiwan, the principal contribution 
of government in the Far Eastern NICs has been to create a modern 
infrastructure, to provide a stable incentive system, and to ensure that 
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government bureaucracy will help rather than hinder exports.” Similarly, 
the World Bank’s landmark World Development Report (1991) (hereafter 
referred to as the Development Challenge), argued that experience shows 
that the government works best when it follows a market friendly 
approach to development. This report is a seminal document as it 
represents what the World Bank economists had learnt up to that time 
from forty years of development experience. In neoclassical writings the 
government is portrayed as being a night watchman state with very little 
serious involvement in the economy. However the facts in East Asia are 
quite different. Singh (1993b) therefore suggests that the relevant issue is 
to what extent, if any, the Japanese followed the Report’s prescriptions and 
a market-friendly approach to development. Did the Japanese government 
intervene in the markets “reluctantly”? Did it, for example, leave prices and 
production priorities to be determined by market forces and simply 
provide the necessary infrastructure for private enterprise to flourish? 
How “transparent” was government intervention in Japanese industry? To 
achieve its colossal economic success, how closely did the Japanese 
economy integrate with the world economy? 
The Developmental Challenge does not acknowledge the inescapable fact 
that there was considerable governmental intervention in the course of 
post-war Japanese development. The important issue, however, is whether 
the World Bank Report’s characterization of these intervention and lessons 
to be drawn from it are valid. Singh (op. cit) calls attention to the 
overwhelming evidence showing that the governments in Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China did not intervene either 
reluctantly or transparently in any of these economies. Specifically, in their 
periods of fast economic growth, the governments in Japan (1950-1073) 
and the Republic of Korea used a wide array of interventionist instruments 
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including: import controls; control over foreign exchange allocations; 
provision of subsidized credit– often at negative real interest rates– to 
favoured firms and industries; control over multinational investment and 
foreign equity ownership; heavy subsidization and “coercion” of exports, 
particularly in the Republic of Korea; a highly active state technology 
policy; restrictions on domestic competition and government 
encouragement of a variety of cartel arrangements in the product markets; 
promotion of conglomerate enterprises through mergers and other 
government measures (the Republic of Korea). The governments in these 
countries not only intervened at the sectoral level, but also far more 
intrusively at the level of the individual firm through so–called 
“administrative guidance”.  
Another important issue is how closely did the economies of these 
countries integrate with the world economy. The virtues of openness, 
international competition and close integration with the world economy 
are stressed in several World Bank publications (see in particular the 
Development Challenge). Evidence suggests, however, that these virtues 
were not in fact practised by either Japan or the Republic of Korea, the two 
East Asian countries we are concentrating on here. 
With respect to the nature and extent of “openness” practised by the East 
Asian economies it may be useful to consider the comparative figures on 
imports of manufacturers into Japan and other industrial countries 
between 1961 and 1979. The 1979 date is significant because that was 
more than five years after Japan had signed the OECD agreement of no 
import controls or tariffs between industrial countries.  The data on 
imports of leading industrial countries between 1961 to 1979 shows that 
as a proportion of GDP Japanese imports rose by 66 per cent. This 
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compares with a threefold increase in corresponding US imports, more 
than tripling of UK imports and a nearly 250 per cent growth in the imports 
of other European Economic Community countries. In 1979, manufactured 
imports constituted only 2.4 per cent of Japanese GDP; the corresponding 
proportion in Britain and other countries of the EEC was five to six times 
larger. Even in the United States, which traditionally, because of its 
continental size, has a relatively closed economy, the volume of imported 
manufacturing goods in the late 1970s was proportionally almost twice as 
large as in Japan. Clearly, during the 1960s and 1970s (and even more so in 
the 1950s) the Japanese economy operated under a regime of draconian 
imports controls, whether practised formally or informally. 
Thus, despite the acknowledged strong export orientation of the Japanese 
economy, it was far from being open or closely integrated with the world 
economy in terms of imports. The imports side of this story does not 
generally get as much attention as it deserves. 
 
 IX. Optimal degree of openness and strategic integration with the 
world economy 
To sum up, the experience of Japan and the Republic of Korea 
comprehensively contradicts the central thesis of many World Bank 
reports that the more open the economy and the closer its integration with 
the global economy, the faster its rate of growth. During their periods of 
rapid growth, instead of a deep or unconditional integration with the world 
economy, these countries evidently sought what might be called “strategic” 
integration, i.e. they integrated up to the point where it was as much in 
their interest to do so as to promote national economic growth. If (as stated 
in the Development Challenge) the purpose of the World Bank  economists 
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was to find out why countries like Japan have been so successful in 
economic development during the last 40 years, they have clearly been 
using the wrong paradigm for examining Japanese economic history. The 
basic problem is that the underlying assumptions of this paradigm are 
greatly at variance with the real world of static and dynamic economies of 
scale, learning by doing and imperfect competition. In such a world, even 
neoclassical analysis now accepts that the optimal degree of openness for a 
country is not “close” integration with the global economy through free 
trade (Krugman, 1987; Rodrik, 1992). In that case, what is the optimal 
degree of openness for the economy? This extremely important policy 
question, however, is not seriously addressed by the orthodox theory. 
Chakravarty and Singh (1988) provide an alternative theoretical 
perspective for considering this issue. To put it briefly, they argue that 
“openness” is a multi- dimensional concept: apart from trade, a country can 
be "open” or not so open with respect to financial and capital markets, in 
relation to technology, science, culture, education, inward and outward 
migration. Moreover, a country can choose to be open in some directions 
(say trade) but not so open in others, such as foreign direct investment or 
financial markets. Their analysis suggests that there is no unique optimum 
form or degree of openness which holds true for all countries at all times. A 
number of factors affect the desirable nature of openness: the world 
configuration, past history of the economy and its state of development, 
among others. The timing and sequence of opening are also critical. They 
point out that there may be serious irreversible losses if the wrong kind of 
openness is attempted or the timing and sequence are incorrect. The East 
Asian experience of “strategic” rather than “close” integration with the 
world economy is fully comprehensible within this kind of theoretical 
framework.   
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X. Multilateral Competition Policy: The main issues between the North 
and the South 
The basic idea of multilateral competition policy is that all member 
countries of the WTO become subject to the same competition policy 
disciplines. The South does not approve of this idea for the simple reason 
that WTO disciplines contain Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) which 
can lead to cross sanctions for the offending parties: the winning party can 
enforce sanctions against the offender in a totally different area than where 
the offence occurred. It is for similar but opposite reasons that the North 
approves of a multinational competition policy. It would like a strongly 
enforced competition agreement which will be binding on all countries.  
The North had originally put forward a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) during 1995-1998. The agreement was drafted and 
proposed by the OECD. Under the terms of this agreement, basically any 
country could invest anywhere, produce anything without let or hindrance 
from any government. The MAI was draconian with respect to developing 
countries. Instead of level playing fields this kind of arrangement would 
have resulted in developing countries being even more handicapped than 
before. Developed country firms are far more capable than those from 
developing countries and thus in free competition the latter would have 
been annihilated. In the event strong opposition to this idea came from not 
only developing countries but also from countries like France. The MAI was 
finally withdrawn and in its place a much milder multilateral agreement 
was subsequently proposed by advanced countries through the European 
Community. 
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This proposal was much more modest and intended to meet the criticism of 
developing countries in relation to MAI. The EC’s proposed multilateral 
agreement on competition policies comprised the following main elements. 
a. All member countries should declare hard-core cartels to be illegal. 
Countries should cooperate in implementing such a ban. Other than this 
ban on hard-core cartels countries can have any provisions in their 
competition laws as they like. 
b. However, these domestic competition laws should be in conformity with 
the core WTO principles of MFN, non-discrimination, national 
treatment, transparency and procedural fairness. 
c. Since the proposal is for a multilateral agreement under the WTO, it is 
therefore subject to the organisation’s dispute settlement mechanism. In 
response to objections from both rich and poor countries, the EC further 
agreed to limit the scope of the application of WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) in the manner specified below. 
i. Thus the proposals stress that “WTO dispute settlement would be 
strictly limited- as is also currently the case under the DSU – to 
complaints brought forward by WTO members. Private individuals and 
firms would have no standing therefore” (EC 2003 pp2).  
ii. The proposals suggest: “we also agree with this view, and strongly 
believe that dispute settlement should be strictly limited to assessing 
the overall conformity of the actual law, regulations and guidelines of 
general applications against the core principles contained in a WTO 
agreement, including a ban on hard core cartels”. 
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iii. In addition the proposals indicate that the DSU would recognise the 
“specific circumstances of developing country members” in considering 
a dispute. 
iv. The proposals also contain an informal peer review in relation to 
compliance and issues of confidentially. Thus the proposals: “Unlike 
dispute settlement which would apply to the obligations contained in 
the WTO competition agreement (cf. above), peer review would aim at a 
wider range of competition law and policy matters. As a WTO 
competition agreement would merely set out a limited number of 
binding obligations, WTO members would remain at liberty to decide for 
themselves whether or not to include additional substantive areas in 
their domestic competition law, including e.g. abuse of dominance. Given 
the distinct nature of peer review, it would be natural and indeed 
appropriate for such a process to address the entirety of a domestic 
competition law framework”. This kind of peer review would 
complement the provisions of the dispute settlement understanding 
(DSU). 
v. In addition the proposals envisage that “a consultation and a co-
operation mechanism would be a key component of any WTO 
competition agreement. A range of issues could be raised under the 
consultation provisions of such an agreement, including one WTO 
member’s assessment – rightly or wrongly – that the domestic 
legislation of another WTO member does not meet the standards 
contained in the WTO agreement, in particular as regards the core 
principles of transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness”. 
On the face of it these EC proposals would seem to be entirely reasonable to 
which nobody should be able to object. The claim is that the proposed 
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multilateral competition policy for the whole world involves only a 
minimum set of rules on which all right- minded people everywhere would 
agree. It is recognised that many developing countries will, nevertheless, 
not have the capacity to implement competition laws and so assistance 
with capacity building is an important part of the EC proposals. 
At this point it may be useful to introduce explicitly into this discussion the 
concept of special and differential treatment12 for developing countries 
whose guiding principle, it may be recalled, is non-reciprocity. Specifically, 
it is proposed that advanced country governments should legislate that 
anti-competitive conduct that is illegal within their jurisdictions would also 
be illegal when carried out by these firms in any developing country. 
Further, that citizens and corporations in developing countries who are 
harmed by these illegal practices can sue for damages in the courts of 
advanced countries and that there should be a fund to facilitate such legal 
action. The principle behind this recommendation is the same as that 
established regarding corruption. 
Returning finally to the multilateral aspect of the EC’s competition policy 
under the aegis of the WTO, there are important arguments from the 
perspective of the organization itself against such an arrangement. 
Competition policy is a complex undertaking, which is certainly required 
today as a discipline on large multinational companies in a globalized 
world. This is an enormous challenge that cannot be undertaken by an 
institution that is already overloaded. Apart from anything else, there are 
good organizational reasons for the WTO to remain sharply focused and to 
use its accumulated capabilities to their best advantage. Moreover, it is not 
just a matter of cartel conduct that needs to be regulated but also other 
                                                          
12
 See further Singh (2003) 
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kinds of market conduct that reduce the ease of entry into international 
markets due to the anti-competitive conduct of dominant firms. For 
example, if private harmful cartels are banned, theory and evidence suggest 
that these will often be replaced by full-scale mergers between the 
previously cartelised, and often convicted firms. Levenstein et al., 2003 
provide recent evidence on this matter. 
In considering these competition proposals it is also important to 
emphasize the fact that the links between competition policy and 
international trade are no more significant than, say, tax policy and 
international trade, infrastructure deficiencies and international trade, or 
education and international trade. As the Strategic Structural Initiative 
Talks between the US and Japan showed, there were more than one 
hundred ways in which trade between these countries was arguably being 
distorted. It would therefore be best for the WTO to confine itself to its core 
competences regarding strictly trade matters, rather than overextend 
through mission creep to an endless string of trade-related matters. This 
would be not just in the interests of developing countries but also be of 
benefit to the world at large. 
Last but not the least, developing countries face more difficult problems 
from a whole gamut of bilateral treaties involving significantly the US and a 
wide range of poor, and not so poor developing countries. These treaties 
are usually one-sided giving United States much more leverage than it 
would get in a multilateral negotiated agreement. The speed at which the 
US is proceeding on these bilateral treaties provide little room for comfort 
for developing countries.  They have no option but to oppose these anti-
development treaties the best they can under the present economic and 
political arrangements for the world economy. 
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XI. CONCLUSION  
The main argument of this paper is that the multilateral competition policy 
proposed by the EU is neither suitable from the perspective of developing 
countries nor from that of the world economy as a whole. As far as 
developing countries are concerned, the policy goes too far in instituting 
homogenization of competition policy and thus deprives them of important 
developmental instruments. On the other hand, from an international 
perspective, the proposed policy is too feeble to deal with the challenges 
posed by large multinational corporations intent on monopolizing world 
markets. 
To deal with this, what is required is greater policy autonomy for 
developing countries and at the same time a more stringent framework for 
dealing with mammoth multinational companies and their endless appetite 
for overseas expansion often through mergers and takeovers. Both the EC’s 
proposals on competition policy and on FDI seem more concerned to 
provide TNCs with additional tools to give them unfettered access to 
developing countries and undermine the latter’s ability to control the 
economy and foster their own domestic companies and national economic 
development. 
What are the policy implications of this wide ranging analysis of 
competition and competition policy issues? The main policy implication is 
that time has come for the establishment of a development oriented 
international competition authority to control anti-competitive conduct 
and particularly growth by mergers of large multinationals.  
The characteristics and responsibilities of this Authority would include: 
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 It would be charged with maintaining fair competition in the world 
economy and keeping the markets contestable by ensuring that the 
barriers-to-entry to late industrialists are kept at low levels. 
 Analogous to the social welfare objectives of the European Commission, 
the proposed International Authority would be asked to pay attention to 
the special needs of the developing countries, to competitive 
opportunities for small and medium sized firms, to facilitate the transfer 
of technology to developing countries, and to ensure fair distribution of 
wealth. 
 It would have the authority to scrutinize mega-mergers and to deter the 
mega-firms from abusing their dominant position. 
 Again on the European Commission model, the International 
Competition Authority would be concerned mainly with cross-border or 
international aspects of the workings of competition. Below the 
authority, at a national level, the member countries would have their 
own national competition policies. 
 
 For good administrative and practical reasons, references to the 
Competition Authority would only be permissible in case of anti-
competitive behaviour by corporations above a certain size. The size 
criterion would normally keep most large developing country 
corporations outside the direct purview of the Competition Authority. In 
view of the large size of many third world corporations, particularly in 
infrastructure, not every corporation from developing countries can be 
provided with special safeguards. The developing country negotiators 
would have to be nimble and be willing to take part in the give and take 
of international negotiations. Developing countries are better off if they 
maintain solidarity and take a long term view. This may persuade 
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developed countries to also eventually adopt long term path of global 
solidarity. The global economy needs cooperation, not just between 
Southern countries, but also between the North and the South. These 
negotiations on the competition policy are a small part of the very large 
global project of goodwill and solidarity which would benefit all nations. 
 
 In relation to the international merger movement, the authority would 
attempt to limit growth by merger by large multinationals under its 
purview. They would be allowed to merge provided they divest 
themselves of a subsidiary of equal value. This would mean that 
multinationals would not be able to grow by mergers, but they could 
expand through organic growth or greenfield investment. It would also 
not stop them from taking over other firms subject to divestiture as 
outlined. 
 
 As argued in detail in Singh (2002), the main merits of this proposal may 
be summed up as follows. A large body of research on mergers indicates 
that mega-mergers have the potential of increasing market dominance 
and reducing contestability. Discouraging such mergers would therefore 
enhance global contestability, global competition, and global economic 
efficiency, while at the same time being distributionally more equitable.  
 
 The governance of the ICA would have proper representation of 
developing countries and would not be dominated by developed 
countries. The following comment from one of the referees is perfectly 
fair when s/he asks how is this “proper representation” for the ICA to be 
   achieved. The only method available to developing countries is to rely on 
  knowledge and seek support from progressive people in rich countries. If 
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you look at this issue historically, developing countries, in relative terms, 
would seem to have done very well over time  in a number of negotiations, 
for example, the difference between the Uruguay Round where the 
developing countries did very badly and the current Doha Round where 
these countries are doing much better.  Having learnt from the previous 
experiences, persuading developed countries that their basic interest 
should be the same as that of developing countries would not be an easy 
gospel to preach. This however, seems to be the only way forward to meet 
the challenges of fast growing population, global warming and other 
extremely difficult problems which the world economy faces. 
 
Although international co-operation on competition policy, would be of 
particular benefit to developing countries, it also has useful features to 
assist the large multinational corporations. The International Competition 
Authority would for example be able to provide multinationals under its 
purview with unambiguous decisions on mergers and other competition 
related matters. Instead of being subject to the often-conflicting decisions 
of many different jurisdictions (e.g. the United States, the European 
Community, Japan, and over time countries like India and China). 
International Competition Authority’s rulings would prevail over all 
national and regional jurisdictions. 
There is no illusion that an international agreement of the above kind 
would immediately be acceptable to advanced countries. Nevertheless, it 
indicates the nature of economic arrangements in this area, which would 
best serve the developmental needs of poor countries. It may, however, be 
helpful to proceed to the establishment of the ICA in stages. At the first 
stage, the Authority may have no coercive powers but simply be able to 
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monitor and to report on abuses of dominant market positions, on mergers, 
and the Authority’s other competition objectives13. Such monitoring would 
itself be beneficial to developing countries as it would provide them with 
information on cartels and on market power abuses of multinationals. 
Developing countries would find it difficult to acquire such information 
otherwise. With the experience gained from this kind of limited 
international co-operation, nations can, over time, work towards greater 
co-operation by giving ICA the necessary powers to enforce its rules. The 
above line of reasoning has been subject to penetrating criticism by the 
editors. This is mainly on the ground that there are serious concerns from 
developing countries point of view about all such international authorities, 
that however good the intentions, they end up being unfair simply because 
of the reality of global power. How would this concern be addressed 
directly, would it not be safer to avoid such a global authority and instead 
suggest common approaches by a set of developing countries towards the 
MNCs.  
The referees point is well taken but unfortunately there are few levers of 
power available to developing countries. They have to do the best they can 
with the limited instruments at their disposal. Solidarity between 
developing countries is certainly one area which  these countries will need 
to explore thoroughly. Instead of abandoning from the outset any prospects 
for a compromise, it would be better to consider such possibilities as a part 
of a global solution. There is no presumption in this context that developed 
countries will not do what is in their best interests. They  will need to be 
persuaded that the kind of proposal suggested here will ultimately also be 
in their interests. For such proposals to work the world’s developing 
                                                          
13
 Scherer(1994) makes similar point in relation to his proposal for an international agreement on competition 
policy. 
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countries would certainly have to embrace South-South cooperation. 
Indeed, they may also have to cultivate North-South cooperation to make it 
easier for developed countries to participate in such projects which would 
be of common benefit to humanity. 
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Table 1: Competition law in selected South-East Asian countries 
 
Adopted from: Table 8, p.265, Mendoza, Barcenas and Mahurkar (2013), 
Journal of Reviews on Global Economics, 2013, vol.2. This table summarises 
the main points of “Balancing industrial concentration and competition for 
economic development in Asia. 
Source Data: Drew and Napier LLC (2012) “Your Country Guide to ASEAN 
Competition Law”, 1 February 2012. 
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Table 2:  Persistence of Profitability in Emerging Markets 
Mean  Positive YiLR Negative YiLR
 
Brazil 0.013 0.003 0.418 
India 0.229 0.003 0.282 
Jordan 0.348 0.05 0.299 
Korea 0.323 0.005 0.3 
Malaysia 0.349 0.009 0.302 
Mexico 0.222 -0.002 0.316 
Zimbabwe 0.421 0.157 0.249 
 
Source: Glen, Lee and Singh (2002). 
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Table 3. Persistence of Profitability Studies for Industrial Countries 
 
Author                 Country   Sample     Observations    Number    Sample mean 
                     Period       per firm            of firms       (i ) 
 
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) UK     1947-77         29   51  0.488 
       France  1965-82         18  55  0.412 
    Germany 1961-81 21  28   0.410 
 
Schwalbach et.al (1989)  Germany 1961-82 22  299   0.485 
 
Mueller (1990)                  US  1950-72         23  551   0.183 
 
Cubbin and Geroski (1990)  UK  1948-77         30  243   0.482  
Khemani and Shapiro (1990)   Canada  1964-82         19  129   0.425 
 
Odagiri and Yamawaki (1990) Japan  1964-82         19  376   0.465 
 
Schohl (1990)   Germany 1961-81 21  283   0.509 
 
Waring (1996)c        US  1970-89 20          12,986   0.540 
a - Based on pre-tax rates of return / net assets 
b – Estimations are for industry groups. Estimates of lambda (  are from a range of specifications for the 
persistence model, which differ across industries.  
c -  Estimate based on pooled data for 128 industry groups.  The mean lambda ( has been 
estimated by the present authors from the data in Table 3 of Waring (1996). 
Source:  Goddard and Wilson (1999)
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